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In August 2014 ISIS conducted a coordinated attack on the Yazidi population of the Mount 
Sinjar area. As a result, the entirety of this Yazidi population was displaced1, and an estimated 
total of 3,1002 Yazidis were killed (approximately half were executed, and the rest died whilst 
fleeing3) and 6,8004 were kidnapped and subjected to numerous abuses, including torture and 
forced religious conversion. The “genocide” is ongoing5 and as of August 2014, there are an 
estimated 3,2006 women and girls still in ISIS captivity. 
 
This article will explore these events in the context of the elements of genocide and with 
references to the findings of the Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry 
on the Syrian Arab Republic and the Report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Iraq in the light of abuses 
committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated group. This 
article will critically examine if, and to what extent, these attacks constitute a genocide within 
the meaning of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (‘Genocide 
Convention’) 1948.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Valeria Cetorelli, Isaac Sasson, Nazar Shabila, Gilbert Burnham‘Mortality and kidnapping estimates for the 
Yazidi population in the area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq, in August 2014: A retrospective household survey’ (2017) 
PLOS Medicine https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002297 accessed 4 May 2019 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 OHCHR, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (15 
June 2016) A/HRC/32/CRP.2 
6 Ibid.  
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Background 
 
The Yazidis are a longstanding ethnic and religious community, the majority of whom live in 
Northern Iraq7 in the Mount Sinjar area (approximately 400,0008 people), where the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had been systematically targeting minority groups in the region 
in a brutal drive to “purify” it of non-Islamic influences9. 
 
On 3 August 2014, ISIS launched an attack specifically targeting the Yazidis and advanced 
convoys into the Sinjar area, surrounding the neighbouring towns and villages, and thus forcing 
Yazidis to seek refuge on Mount Sinjar, which ISIS subsequently encircled leaving the Yazidis 
trapped without supplies or shelter10. Men and older women who were unable to flee in time 
were executed by means of shooting or beheading11. Young women, girls and boys were 
kidnapped12: the women and girls who had attained the age of 913 were used and/or sold into 
sexual or domestic slavery and the young boys who had attained the age of 714 were sent to 
training camps to be indoctrinated into ISIS as fighters or suicide bombers15.  
                                                 
7 Dave van Zoonen, Khogir Wirya,‘Yazidis: Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict’ (2017) Middle East 
Research Institute <www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Yazidis-Perceptions-of-Reconciliation-and-Conflict-
Report.pdf> accessed 4 May 2019 
8 Valeria Cetorelli, Isaac Sasson, Nazar Shabila, Gilbert Burnham‘Mortality and kidnapping estimates for the 
Yazidi population in the area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq, in August 2014: A retrospective household survey’ (2017) 
PLOS Medicine https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002297 accessed 4 May 2019 
9 Amnesty International ‘Ethnic cleansing on a historic scale: Islamic State’s systematic targeting of minorities in 
Northern Iraq’ (2014) <www.es.amnesty.org/uploads/media/Iraq_ethnic_cleansing_final_formatted.pdf > 
accessed 4 May 2019 
10 Valeria Cetorelli, Isaac Sasson, Nazar Shabila, Gilbert Burnham‘Mortality and kidnapping estimates for the 
Yazidi population in the area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq, in August 2014: A retrospective household survey’ (2017) 
PLOS Medicine 
11 ibid 
12 Yazda and the Free Yezidi Foundation, ‘ISIL: Nationals of ICC states parties committing genocide and other 
crimes against the Yazidis’ (Free Yezidi Foundation, 2015) <www.freeyezidi.org/wp-content/uploads/Corr-
RED-ISIL-commiting-genocide-ag-the-Yazidis.pdf> accessed 5 May 2019 
13 OHCHR, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (15 
June 2016) A/HRC/32/CRP.2 
14 Ibid. 
15 Jewish World Watch, ‘Iraq (The Yazidis)’ (Jewish World Watch, 2019) <www.jww.org/conflict-areas/iraq-
yazidis/> accessed 4 May 2019 
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United States humanitarian aid airdrops and helicopter rescue missions between 8 – 13 August 
2014 enabled most of the trapped Yazidis to be evacuated into the Kurdistan region where the 
majority of the displaced population (300,00016 Yazidis) now reside in displaced persons 
camps. Others from the evacuated population are reportedly in refugee camps in Syria (around 
15,00017), or have crossed into Turkey (at least 30,00018), whilst some (an estimated 10,00019) 
remain in makeshift camps on Mount Sinjar20.  
 
The Elements of Genocide 
 
The Acts of Genocide  
Genocide can be committed in various forms21: killing members of a group; causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions 
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; or forcibly transferring children of the group to 
another group. 
                                                 
16 Board of Relief and Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Report on IDP camps in Duhok’ (BRHA Duhok, 2015) <www.brha-
duhok.org/wpcontent/uploads/Report%20on%20the%20IDP%20camps%20in%20Dohuk-June%202015.pdf> 
accessed 8 May 2019 
17 Maha Sidky, Ariane Rummery, ‘UNHCR steps up aid as Yazidis stream into Syria from Iraq’s Mount Sinjar’ 
(UNHCR, 14 August 2014) <www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2014/8/53ecb7a29/unhcr-steps-aid-yazidis-stream-
syria-iraqs-mount-sinjar.html> accessed 10 May 2019 
18 Tulin Daloglu, ‘How will Turkey React to Stream of Kurdish Refugees?’ (Al-Monitor, September 22 2014) 
<www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/turkey-syria-iraq-kobani-isis-kurds-pkk.html> accessed 8 May 
2019 
19 Editorial Staff, ‘One doctor for 10,000 people in Iraq’s Yazidi Mount Sinjar’ (Ekurd Daily, 2015) 
<https://ekurd.net/one-doctor-for-10000-people-in-iraqs-yazidi-mount-sinjar-2015-01-13> accessed 10 May 
2019 
20 REACH Initiative, ‘REACH overview: Displacement from Sinjar, 3-14 August 2014’ (2014) <www.reach-
initiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/REACH_IRQ_InternalDisplacement_Briefing_August2014_Sinjar.pdf> accessed 4 
May 2019 
21 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (opened for signature 9 December 1948, entered 
into force 12 January 2002), 78 UNTS 277, Art 2 
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The above acts were clearly committed during the ISIS attack on the Yazidis. In addition to the 
killings, members of the Yazidi community suffered serious bodily or mental harm due not 
only to the trauma executions and kidnappings themselves, but also as a result of the starvation, 
dehydration and exposure they suffered whilst surrounded on Mount Sinjar by ISIS forces. The 
execution of adults, the sexual slavery of women and the indoctrination of the children are all 
measures intended to prevent births within the group and thus compromise the sustainability 
of the Yazidi community. Similarly, the children who were kidnapped for sexual slavery or to 
fight were forcibly transferred from the Yazidi group to the ISIS group, which both destroyed 
their identities as Yazidi people and prevented them from continuing or rebuilding their Yazidi 
community. Furthermore, the siege of Mount Sinjar and the treatment of the kidnapped women 
and children constitute conditions of life deliberately imposed to bring about the physical 
destruction of the group, as these measures ensured that the entire Yazidi community was either 
killed or displaced. 
 
By their very nature, the acts committed by ISIS amount to genocidal acts. However, the fact 
that the requisite act(s) are committed does not in itself amount to a genocide within the 
meaning of the Genocide Convention. The question, therefore, is in fact not whether these are 
genocidal acts, but rather whether these genocidal acts will amount to a genocide by reason of 
having been carried out against a protected group and with the required intent. Accordingly, 
the determination of the status of the Yazidi community and an exploration of ISIS’ intent in 
carrying out these acts are central to identifying whether the Yazidi massacre constitutes a 
genocide. 
 
Identifying a ‘Protected Group’ 
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A protected group within the meaning of the Rome Statute is one which is religious (consisting 
of individuals who “share the same religion, denomination or mode of worship”22), ethnic 
(“individuals who share a common language or culture”23), racial (conventionally meaning 
“the hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, 
cultural, national or religious factors”24) or national (individuals “perceived to share a legal bond 
based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties”25)26.  
 
Whilst this definition may be prima facie clear and definite, the identification of a group may 
present a challenge where the conflict arises within what an individual external to the situation 
would likely objectively consider one group. In these circumstances, the application of the 
convention definition becomes more uncertain. The determination of the composition of a 
group must therefore be made on a case-by-case basis27, and thus it is crucial to take a more 
subjective approach and consider the cultural context in which the conflict began - although 
some judgements support the view that a group must nonetheless have some objective 
existence28. Particularly important here, is the notion that “collective identities … are by their 
very nature social constructs”29, meaning that a group may also be identified by how the group 
distinguishes itself or how the group is perceived by others (including the perpetrator)30.  
 
The Yazidis follow rules and customs governing their quotidian lives and view themselves 
very much external to those outside their community which may suggest they are a distinct 
                                                 
22 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, Article 6 
27 Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgement) IT-99-37-T (1 September 2004) 
28 Prosecutor v Rutaganda, (Judgement) ICTR-96-3-T (December 6 1999). 
29 Guglielmo Verdirame, “The Genocide Definition in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals”, (2000) 49 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 592. 
30 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana (Judgement) ICTR-95-1-T (May 21 1999) 
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national group. However, this is also a somewhat more tenuous identification, as they also 
share common citizenship, a reciprocity of rights and duties with the rest of the Iraqi 
population, and certainly with neighboring communities. It is therefore quite unlikely that the 
Yazidis could be properly considered a separate national group. 
 
The Yazidi people believe that they were created first before any other race of people, as they 
are descended from Adam only, whilst the rest of humanity was later created and descended 
from both Adam and Eve31. Therefore, insofar as a group may be defined by its self-perception 
and self-identification, it may be argued that the Yazidi people are indeed a distinct racial 
group. However, it should be noted that this is perhaps a more tenuous distinction in 
comparison to identifying the Yazidis as a religious or ethnic group, as it may be argued that, 
geographically (notwithstanding their language, culture, religion or nationality as suggested in 
Akayesu), the Yazidis belong to the wider Kurdish racial group and therefore are not a distinct 
racial group.  
 
Moreover, the fact that ISIS appear to have viewed and targeted the Yazidis as a distinct group 
on the grounds of their cultural and religious identity, as opposed to their racial identity, would 
also suggest that it is unlikely that the Yazidis could be properly considered a distinct racial 
group within the meaning of the Genocide Convention. This is particularly unlikely in light of 
the fact that the perception of the perpetrator and his subjective belief that the individuals in 
question are part of a distinct group is a more persuasive and arguably appropriate means by 
                                                 
31 Who, What Why, ‘Who are the Yazidis?’ (BBC, 8 August 2014) < http://www.yeziditruth.org > accessed 9 May 
2019 
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which a protected group should be identified32 - indeed, the perpetrator's intent is inevitably “a 
decisive element in the crime of genocide” 33.  
One may also consider that the Yazidis in fact speak the same Kurdish language as other Kurds, 
and many also speak Arabic due to their proximity to Arab neighbourhoods34, and therefore 
the Yazidis are arguably not a distinct ethnic group from other Kurds or Arabs. However, the 
definition of ‘ethnic’ encompasses “language or culture”, and whilst they may share a common 
language, they evidently do not share broader Kurdish culture. For example, contact with 
outsiders is discouraged and so Yazidis often seek to avoid formal education and military 
service35. The Yazidi people also follow specific rules, such as the prohibition of blue clothing, 
certain foods and the pronunciation of the word ‘Shayṭān’ (Satan). It would therefore be 
appropriate to consider the Yazidi people as a distinct ethnic group. 
 
Perhaps most saliently, the Yazidis are also a distinct religious minority, as they hold particular 
and unique beliefs and customs which combine elements of Islam, Zoroastrianism, Christianity 
and Judaism spanning thousands of years’36 and differ from neighbouring groups. Moreover, 
Yazidis do not allow conversions into or out of the Yazidi community further demonstrating 
that the Yazidi people view themselves as a distinct group which is not only religious, but 
ethnic as well. ISIS on their part have branded the Yazidi people as “devil worshippers”37 and 
                                                 
32 Prosecutor v Jelisić (Judgement) IT-95-10-T (14 December 1999) 
33 William A. Schabas, ‘Was Genocide Committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina? First Judgments of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2001) 25 Fordham International Law Journal 23 
34 Dave van Zoonen, Khogir Wirya,‘Yazidis: Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict’ (2017) Middle East 
Research Institute <www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Yazidis-Perceptions-of-Reconciliation-and-Conflict-
Report.pdf> accessed 7 May 2019 
35 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica ‘Encyclopaedia Britannica: ‘Yazīdī’ (Encyclopaedia Britanica inc. 
2018) <www.britannica.com/topic/Yazidi > accessed 4 May 2019 
36 OHCHR, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (15 
June 2016) A/HRC/32/CRP.2 
37 Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, ‘“Our Generation is gone.” The Islamic State’s targeting 
of Iraqi minorities in Ninewa’ (2015) <https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Iraq-Bearing-Witness-Report-
111215.pdf> accessed 5 May 2019 
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“infidels”38, demonstrating that as perpetrators, they also perceive the Yazidis as a distinct 
group.  
 
However, although the subjective approach is an important contextual consideration, it cannot 
always be properly regarded as the only consideration in the identification of a protected group. 
Arguably, the objective existence of the group must also be determined to ensure that the law 
does not “permit the crime to be defined by the offender alone”39. 
 
This being said, a protected group will most often be apparent in the specific context of each 
case40. Indeed, in the case of the Yazidi massacre, it appears evident that the Yazidis constitute 
a religious and ethnic group, both objectively and from their own, and crucially, the 
perpetrator’s own, subjective perspective. As such, the Yazidis clearly fall within the scope of 
‘protected group’ under both the statutory and case law definitions. 
 
A Group ‘in Whole or in Part’ 
 
International case law has made clear that a ‘part’ of the group amounts to a “substantial part”41 
or a “considerable number of individuals”42 - though not necessarily a “very important part”43 
of the group. It is also suggested that ‘in part’ indicates “a reasonably significant number, 
relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group such as its 
                                                 
38 OHCHR, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (15 
June 2016) A/HRC/32/CRP.2 
39 William A. Schabas, ‘Was Genocide Committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina? First Judgments of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2001) 25 Fordham International Law Journal 23 
40 Max van der Stoel, ‘Prevention of Minority Conflicts’, in Louis B. Sohn (ed) The CSCE and the Turbulent New 
Europe (Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung 1993) 
41 Prosecutor v Semanza (Judgement) ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003) 
42 Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana (Judgement) ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) 
43 Prosecutor v Jelisić (Judgement) IT-95-10-T (14 December 1999) 
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leadership”44. The Yazidi population is estimated at less than 1.5 million45, with communities 
primarily located across Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Armenia. Therefore, whilst the attack on the 
Yazidis of the Sinjar area evidently targets only part of the population, crucially, it targets the 
largest community of that population – and moreover, 400,000 out of 1.5 million Yazidis 
(nearly one third) clearly amounts to a ‘significant part’ of the group relative to the total. 
 
Furthermore, it may be pertinent to consider the United States’ implementation of the Genocide 
Convention in its domestic legislation, in which ‘substantial part’ is defined as “a part of a 
group of such numerical significance that the destruction or loss of that part would cause the 
destruction of the group as a viable entity within the nation of which such group is a part.”46 
By attacking the Sinjar community specifically - the largest and culturally most significant 
Yazidi community - whether by means of killing, preventing the continuation of births, 
religious practices or the rebuilding of the community, it was inevitable that there would be 
lasting repercussions on not only this specific community, but also the Yazidi people as a 
whole.  
 
Genocidal Intent – ‘Dolus Specialis’ 
 
Aside from consideration of the acts and the protected parties themselves, the presence of 
genocidal intent is the crux of identifying a genocide, as it is this element of ‘surplus intent’47 
                                                 
44 Ben Whitaker, ‘Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 
45 Valeria Cetorelli, Isaac Sasson, Nazar Shabila, Gilbert Burnham‘Mortality and kidnapping estimates for the 
Yazidi population in the area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq, in August 2014: A retrospective household survey’ (2017) 
PLOS Medicine 
46 Genocide Convention Implementation Act 1987, s.1093 (8) (US) 
47 Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgement) IT-97-24 (31 July 2003) 
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that decisively sets apart the crime of genocide from other lesser crimes48, such as crimes 
against humanity or war crimes. Genocidal intent is a ‘dolus specialis’ (special intent) which 
imposes a requirement that the perpetrator specifically intends to produce the act charged. It is 
two-fold49 in that Genocidal intent requires both the criminal intent to commit the underlying 
crime (for example, causing grievous bodily harm) and the specific intent ‘to destroy in whole 
or in part’ the targeted group50. Importantly, the genocide must target the group ‘as such’ 
meaning as a “separate and distinct entity”51, as opposed to only one or several individuals for 
a particular reason. The victims must have been targeted because of the fact that they belonged 
to a particular group, and as a means of destroying the group to which they belong52.  
 
In the absence of direct evidence of genocidal intent, it may be inferred from a number of facts 
and circumstances, for instance the general context, the deliberate and systematic targeting of 
members of a group whilst sparing non-members, the scale of atrocities committed53, the 
physical targeting of the group or their property, the number or proportion of the group affected 
and the derogatory language used towards them54. Furthermore, it is for the court to determine 
the appropriate requirement to be met for establishing a mental element regarding knowledge 
of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis55 and, whilst the ‘existence of a plan or policy is 
not a legal ingredient of the crime’56, it may go to evidence genocidal intent. 
 
                                                 
48 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind with 
commentaries’, 1996  
49 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
to the United Nations Secretary-General’ (25 January 2005) 
50 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) 
51 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind with 
commentaries’, 1996 
52 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda (Judgment) ICTR-96-3 (6 December 1999) 
53 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment)ICTR-96-4-T, T Ch I (2 September 1998) 
54 Kayishema and Ruzindana (Judgement) ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) 
55 Elements of Crimes, Article 6 
56 Prosecutor v Jelisić (Appeal Judgement) IT-95-10 (5 July 2001) 
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Most indicative of ISIS’ genocidal intent is the specific type of attacks carried out and the way 
in which they were conducted. The attacks were tailored to the religious and cultural customs 
of the Yazidi people so as to efficiently target and undermine them and cause the community 
to collapse. The killing of older men and women ensured that families could rarely be rebuilt 
and that military aged men could not aid in the defence of the community. It also meant that 
many women who survived and were able to re-join their families - particularly women with 
limited education (as was the case for many) or those from rural areas – struggled to survive, 
as they lacked personal and financial independence and had relied heavily on their husbands 
for communication beyond their own families.57 The abduction and indoctrination of the 
children - whether as slaves or as fighters – worked to destroy the culture and religion that the 
younger generation would have grown up around and continued, as well as preventing them 
from trying to return to their community and rebuild it. 
The sexual slavery of the young women was also designed to be destructive in a unique way 
in this cultural context, as until recently, children born as a result of ISIS rapes would not be 
allowed into the Yazidi faith/culture due to the fact that Yazidism requires a child to have two 
Yazidi parents58 and Iraqi law dictates that children should be registered under the religion of 
their fathers. Therefore, women were required to give up their child before being allowed to 
re-join the community - it only as of 24 April 2019 that the Yazidi Supreme Spiritual Council 
have decreed that they will accept both the ISIS rape survivors and their children back into the 
community59. 
 
                                                 
57 OHCHR, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (15 
June 2016) A/HRC/32/CRP.2 
58 OHCHR, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’ (15 
June 2016) A/HRC/32/CRP.2 
59 Martin Chulov, ‘Yazidi leaders to allow Isis rape survivors to return with children’ The Guardian (27 April 
2019) 
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The specific choice to target the Sinjar region further goes to evidence the intent to destroy the 
Yazidi community. This is not only the largest Yazidi community, but importantly the 
Nineveh-Dohuk and Sinjar region is home to their shrines, holy places and ancestral lands60 
which are central to the Yazidi cultural and religious identity, particularly the main temple in 
Lalesh as they believe this is where creation began61. Arguably, the choice to attack the most 
prominent Yazidi community, one that is “emblematic of the overall group”62 is a deliberate 
choice not only in terms of the significant number of potential victims, but also in terms of 
threatening, weakening or terrorising the other, smaller Yazidi communities and the Yazidi 
faith and ethnic group as a whole.  
 
Moreover, these attacks were carried out on civilians of all ages, genders and professions63 (as 
opposed to military forces only). Although civilians “undoubtedly are capable of bearing arms, 
they do not constitute the same kind of military threat as professional soldiers”64, and therefore 
the indiscriminate nature of the attack demonstrates a disregard the rules of war and strongly 
suggests that this was not solely a military attack but a distinct attempt to target and destroy 
the group itself. 
 
However, there is scope to argue that the attack on the Yazidis was ‘ethnic cleansing’ as 
opposed to genocide. Whilst both horrific crimes, genocide requires the intent to destroy, 
                                                 
60 Practice Lab Report, ‘Executive Summary’ (Vanderbilt Law School) 
<https://law.vanderbilt.edu/academics/academic-programs/international-legal-
studies/Yazidi_Genocide_Opinion_KRG_4.15.pdf> accessed 9 May 2019 
61 Dave van Zoonen, Khogir Wirya,‘Yazidis: Perceptions of Reconciliation and Conflict’ (2017) Middle East 
Research Institute <www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Yazidis-Perceptions-of-Reconciliation-and-Conflict-
Report.pdf> accessed 8 May 2019 
62 Prosecutor v. Popovic (Judgement) IT-05-88-T (10 June 2010) 
63 Valeria Cetorelli, Isaac Sasson, Nazar Shabila, Gilbert Burnham‘Mortality and kidnapping estimates for the 
Yazidi population in the area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq, in August 2014: A retrospective household survey’ (2017) 
PLOS Medicine 
64 Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) ICTR-98-33-A (19 April 2004) 
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whereas ethnic cleansing instead refers to the intent to displace a group, “a purposeful policy 
designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the 
civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas”.65 ISIS 
very clearly regarded the attack as a means of ‘purifying’, and has specifically targeted the 
Sinjar area. Furthermore, the Yazidis were in fact one of several persecuted non-Islamic 
minorities in the area66, and whilst this particular attack specifically targeted the Yazidi people, 
one may argue that it was not carried out with the genocidal intent to destroy the Yazidi group 
but rather one attack in a series of attacks intended to displace any group that was not ISIS. 
Therefore, the ISIS attack on the Yazidis is arguably one aimed at ethnic cleansing, and as such 
may amount to crimes against humanity or war crimes, but not genocide67. 
 
Genocide versus Crimes Against Humanity 
 
It has been argued that ‘crimes against humanity’ would be more appropriate to define crimes 
such as those carried out during the Yazidi massacre, with some even going on to posit that the 
concept of ‘genocide’ does little, if anything, to add to international criminal law except create 
a “discrimination between protected groups that has no grounding in legal theory”68, and 
therefore there should be “sole reliance on crimes against humanity”69 which already provides 
for the underlying acts of genocide. 
 
                                                 
65 United Nations Security Council, ‘Report of the Commission of Experts on the evidence of grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia’ (27 May 1994) S/1994/674 
66 Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, ‘“Our Generation is gone.” The Islamic State’s targeting 
of Iraqi minorities in Ninewa’ (2015) <https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Iraq-Bearing-Witness-Report-
111215.pdf> accessed 5 May 2019 
67 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) 
68 Dov Jacobs, ‘Moving Past the Genocide Debate: Mass Atrocities and the International Community’, Theory 
vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners, (ISA Annual Convention 2010, New Orleans 
69 ibid 
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However, the majority of jurisdictions “recognize degrees of the crime based on differences in 
the mental element alone”70 even where the act(s) committed are identical71. This could equally 
apply to the crime of genocide, which, despite the elements of actus reus it shares with crimes 
against humanity72, is differentiated and aggravated by the genocidal intent element73 which is 
omitted from crimes against humanity74. Therefore, the term ‘genocide’, should not be 
conflated with ‘crimes against humanity’75, despite the potential definitional overlap76. In the 
instance of the Yazidi massacre, ISIS’ genocidal intent is readily inferred, and thus the crimes 
take on “a further degree of seriousness”77, and surpass the threshold required for crimes 
against humanity. To label them as such would therefore be inaccurate and inappropriate, as it 
would not properly acknowledge the exact nature of the crimes that took place and undermine 
the true severity of this case. 
 
The Wider Implications of a Finding of ‘Genocide’ 
 
The label ‘genocide’ is important not only in terms of its accuracy in describing the crimes but 
also because of the political significance and legal implications attached to the term. The 
importance of the correct terminology becomes particularly apparent when consideration is 
given to the correlation between the type of crime and the measures required.  
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Genocide is widely regarded one of the gravest crimes, and as such, there are implications for 
the kind of response and attention it receives. For example, the term is often perceived to have 
the “ability to motivate public opinion and mobilize international consensus”78.  In theory, the 
label ‘genocide’ also has the “legal power to bind states to take action to halt genocide”79. It is 
true, however, that in practice, it may at times be counterproductive and lead to states avoiding 
the use this label to evade any obligation they may have to intervene80. In fact, even where the 
conclusion has been reached that a genocide has occurred, action has not always been 
forthcoming - the United States’ inaction during the conflict in Darfur being an example of 
this81. 
 
This being said, despite the shortcomings to date in addressing these issues, the use of the term 
genocide nonetheless carries “the heaviest stigma in the popular and in the diplomatic world”82, 
and is potentially very powerful in determining “how we react to and prevent the gravest of 
international crimes”83. Therefore, though the primary importance of defining the Yazidi 
massacre a ‘genocide’ lies it its legal distinction from other crimes, it is evident that the 
ramifications of such a finding would extend beyond the legal system. 
 
Conclusion  
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In conclusion, the acts committed by ISIS against the Yazidis satisfy the statutory definition of 
genocide as set out by the Genocide Convention of 1948: genocidal acts were committed, the 
Yazidis constitute a protected group, and ISIS appear to have the requisite genocidal intent to 
destroy, at least in part, the Yazidi community.  
 
Both killing and causing serious bodily or mental harm as genocidal act require proof of a 
result84. The sheer scale of the atrocities which targeted one third of the global Yazidi 
population evidences not only the commission of the acts themselves but the destructive intent 
of the perpetrators85. The mental and bodily harm suffered (though not necessarily permanent 
and irreversible86) goes  “beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation”, and 
has resulted “in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and 
constructive life”87 as required by case law.  
The conditions of life imposed on those subjected to the siege of Mount Sinjar were clearly 
intended to ultimately bring about the physical destruction of the Yazidis due to the lack of 
supplies and medical care88. With regards to the conditions of life imposed on those kidnapped 
for slavery and indoctrination, it may be argued that they were calculated to dissolve (but not 
destroy) the group which would constitute a crime against humanity, but not a genocidal act89. 
However, the conditions of life were nonetheless measures which prevented births within the 
group and forcibly transferred children. Ultimately, whilst a plan or policy is not required to 
establish genocidal intent90, the range of acts that ISIS committed against the Yazidis during 
the attack and the way in which they were carried out demonstrates a “context of a manifest 
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pattern of conduct aimed at the destruction”91 of the Yazidi group specifically. Therefore, the 
ISIS attack on the Yazidis does indeed constitute a genocide and it is important that it be 
recognised as such. Despite this, and despite the fact that the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) has jurisdiction over crimes of genocide92 and that arguably, universal jurisdiction may 
also apply (considering the severity of the crime and the involvement of ISIS which is of global 
concern), individual perpetrators - or indeed co-perpetrators - have yet to be prosecuted. 
Meanwhile, several thousand Yazidis are still in ISIS captivity and thus the genocide is 
ongoing93. 
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